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Abstract— Deep reinforcement learning methods have been
widely used in recent years for autonomous vehicle’s decision-
making. A key issue is that deep neural networks can be fragile
to adversarial attacks or other unseen inputs. In this paper,
we address the latter issue: we focus on generating socially
acceptable perturbations (SAP), so that the autonomous vehicle
(AV agent), instead of the challenging vehicle (attacker), is
primarily responsible for the crash. In our process, one attacker
is added to the environment and trained by deep reinforcement
learning to generate the desired perturbation. The reward is
designed so that the attacker aims to fail the AV agent in a
socially acceptable way. After training the attacker, the agent
policy is evaluated in both the original naturalistic environment
and the environment with one attacker. The results show that
the agent policy which is safe in the naturalistic environment
has many crashes in the perturbed environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, deep learning algorithms
(DLA) and deep natural network (DNN) have been widely-
used in different fields. From image recognition [1], speech
recognition [2], to natural language processing [3]. However,
recent research shows that DNNs may be vulnerable to
adversarial perturbations. In [4], the authors found that adver-
sarial image patches can lead white-box DNNs to erroneous
classification results. Papernot et al. in [5] further developed
an attack using synthetic data generation, to craft adversarial
image examples mis-classified by black-box DNNs. A more
comprehensive overview of adversarial attack on DNN can
be found in [6].
DNNs have been used in the field of deep reinforcement
learning (DRL), where the goal is to train an agent to
maximize the expected return. DNN can work as an actor
net or a critic net, to provide the optimal policy directly or
estimate the expected future return for different actions. DRL
policies are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. In [7], the
authors characterize different types of attack on DRL, which
can be attacked by adding perturbation to observations or
environment transition probabilities. To perturb observations,
researchers first follows the same ideas as attacking DNN,
which leads the DRL policy to a different action [8], [9]. In
[7], the environment transition model is perturbed. However,
as pointed out by the authors, these attacks are useful only
under very specific conditions.
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In the field of autonomous vehicles (AV), researchers
also tried to attack existing AV system for the purpose of
evaluation or synthesis. In a recent report [10], Tencent’s
Keen Security Lab showed how they were able to bamboozle
a Tesla Model S into switching lanes to drive directly into
the oncoming traffic by manipulating the input video. This
attack is in the category of observation attack. To our best
knowledge, there has been little study on attacking the
environment transition model, which is the main contribution
of this paper.
This paper will focus on finding an adversarial policy (i.e.
for the attacker) to socially acceptable attacks for a given
victim agent. In other words, we focus on manipulating
the environment transition function (by adding an attacker)
which is limited to attacks that when crashes are generated,
the responsibility is attributed to the AV agent. The paper
is organized as follows. In Section II, related works are
introduced, followed by Section III, where we give a brief
review on reinforcement learning. Section IV describes the
details of the victim policy. In Section V, we introduce the
training environment and develop socially acceptable attack
design. The simulation setup and results are shown in Section
VI and VII, respectively. Our paper is concluded by Section
VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
One of the most widely used adversarial attack techniques
is the fast gradient sign method (FGSM). It is originally
used in image recognition attack. With small modification,
policies obtained through reinforcement learning can also be
attacked by this method. With the assumption of white-box
attacks, in [8], the authors use FGSM to generate adversarial
observations, leading to a pre-trained policy to lose the Pong
game. Lin et al. in [9] further developed an enchanting attack
aimed at maliciously luring an agent to a certain state. Xiao et
al. in [7] extended FGSM to black-box attacks via imitation
learning and other methods.
In general, an attacker does not have direct access to
the victim’s observations. Under this assumption, Gleave
et al. [11] demonstrate the existence of adversarial poli-
cies in zero-sum games between humanoid robots against
black-box victims trained via state-of-the-art reinforcement
learning. The adversarial policies reliably win against the
victims but generate seemingly random and uncoordinated
behavior which is definitely not a “direct” attack. Although
using multi-agent reinforcement learning to solve a zero-
sum Markov game has a long history (from 1994 [12]), [11]
inspired us to think: can we design an attacker car which
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can cause failures of the victim car (crash) without directly
crash into it?
We managed to achieve this objective based on results
presented in other related works. In [13], the authors intro-
duced a responsibility-sensitive safety (RSS) model which
formalizes an interpretation of “Duty of Care” from Tort
law. The Duty of Care states that an individual should
exercise “reasonable care” while performing acts that have
the potential harm others. RSS is a rigorous mathematical
model formalizing an interpretation of the law which is
applicable to self-driving cars. This RSS mathematical model
has been successfully implemented in NHTSA pre-crash
situation in [14]. By interpreting the responsibility, we can
attack the victim in the way described in [7], which perturbs
the environment transition model, with the requirement that
reward is given only when the victim is responsible for the
crash.
In this paper, we use the Markov game framework since
there is an attacker and a victim in this environment. Finding
an adversarial policy is a single-agent reinforcement learning
problem because the victim’s policy is fixed.
III. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING BASICS
In reinforcement learning, an agent is trying to learn
an optimal policy to maximize the cumulative reward in-
teracting with the environment. Usually the problem is
modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP), defined as:
M = (S,A,P, R, γ), where S ⊆ Rn is the state, A ⊆ Rm
is the action, and P : S ×A → S is the transition dynamics
which is usually stochastic. And R : S ×A →R is the
reward function while γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor.
For each time step t, the agent tries to learn a policy
piα(st) = at with parameters α, where st ∈ S is the state at
time t and at ∈ A is the action at time t. The expectation
of future cumulative reward starting from state s following
policy piα can be described as:
V (s|piα) = Epiα,M
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtrt
∣∣∣s0 = s] , (1)
where rt is the reward at time t and V is the value function.
And Q function (action value function) is defined as:
Q(s, a|piα) = Epiα,M
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtrt
∣∣∣s0 = s, a0 = a] . (2)
The goal of reinforcement learning is to maximize the
expected accumulative reward, i.e. Epi [
∑∞
t=0 γ
trt]. For
a discrete action space, the optimal policy can be ob-
tained by learning the accurate Q function Q∗ following
the optimal policy piopt and thus we have piopt(s) =
arg maxa(Q
∗(s, a|piopt)) which is the greedy policy. Ac-
curate Q function with the optimal policy must satisfy the
Bellman equation:
Q∗(s, a|piopt) = r + γEs′
[
max
a′
Q∗(s′, a′)
]
, (3)
where s′ is the next state.
For high dimensional state space or continuous state space,
functional approximation of the Q value is necessary to
ensure tractability of the solution. While Q-learning for
continuous state space with approximation could cause the
Q-network to diverge [15], Deep Q-Network (DQN) [16] has
successfully demonstrated value function convergence with
empirical results using experience replay buffer and target
network.
In this work, we use Double Deep Q-Network (DDQN) as
the reinforcement learning algorithm. DDQN is a variation of
DQN which uses a target Q-Network to select actions for the
evaluation of the next Q value. The technique addresses the
problem of overestimating future return (i.e. overoptimism).
For details, please refer to the original paper [17].
IV. THE AV POLICY
In this section, the environment for training the victim
AV agent is described. We study a discretionary lane change
decision making problem in this paper. The state space,
action space, the victim training reward, and the simulation
environment are introduced. For benchmark purposes, the
problem definition and the simulation environment are the
same as the one used in [18].
A. Training Environment
The victim environment used in this work is a three lane
highway simulator based on [18]. The AV is driving with
up to six surrounding vehicles (three vehicles in front, three
vehicles behind) as shown in Fig. 1. The blue box is the AV
and the 6 red boxes are the six surrounding vehicles whose
states are observed. The remaining boxes are environment
vehicles whose states are not observed. The surrounding
vehicles driving strategy is also descried in [18].
Fig. 1: Three lane highway simulator. The blue box: the
AV; red boxes: 6 nearest surrounding vehicles; empty boxes:
unobserved surrounding vehicles
The state space S ⊆ Rn of the learning agent (AV)
includes AV’s lateral position y, longitudinal velocity vx
and the relative longitudinal position of the ith surrounding
vehicle ∆xi, and the relative lateral position of the ith sur-
rounding vehicle ∆yi and the relative longitudinal velocity
of the ith surrounding vehicle ∆vix. In total, we have a state
space of 2 + 3× 6(cars) = 20 dimensions, i.e. S ⊆ R20.
The actions of both the AV and the surrounding vehicles
are discrete. As defined in [18], we consider four action
choices along the longitudinal direction ax, namely, maintain
speed, accelerate, brake, and hard brake. Whereas for lateral
actions ay , we assume three choices, lane keep, change lane
to right, and change lane to left. In total, we define 12
different discrete actions a = [ax, ay]. For detailed action
parameters, please refer to [18].
B. Reward Function
The reward rv is as defined in [18]. It is formulated as a
function of (dx, y, vx), where dx is the distance between the
AV and its lead vehicle, y is the lateral position of the AV
and vx is its longitudinal velocity. The reward is defined as:
rx =
{
exp
(
− (dx−dxsafe)210dxsafe
)
− 1, if dx < dxsafe
0, otherwise
(4)
ry = exp
(
− (y − ydes)
2
ynorm
)
− 1, (5)
rv = exp
(
− (vx − vdes)
2
vnorm
)
− 1, (6)
where dxsafe, ydes and vdes are the safe longitudinal dis-
tance to the lead vehicle, the target lane position, and desired
speed, respectively. These three rewards are normalized by
10dxsafe, ynorm and vnorm, respectively, so that no single
reward dominates the total reward. Then we have rv =
1
3 (rx + ry + rv) if no collision and r
e = −2 if collision
occurs.
After learning in an environment without attacker, the AV
learned to keep a safe distance from the front vehicle, drive
in the center of a lane and drive as fast as possible without
violating the speed limit. On top of that, we implemented a
“short-horizon safety check” that evaluates the action chosen
by the agent based on traffic rules and provides an alternative
action when needed [18].
V. SOCIALLY ACCEPTABLE ATTACKS
In this Section, the process for obtaining socially accept-
able attacks will be introduced. As discussed in Section I
and II, we want to attack the AV agent by perturbing the
environment transition probability with the requirement that
the AV agent takes the responsibility of the crash. To do that,
we add an attack agent near the AV agent and train it with
reward considering socially acceptable attacks.
A. Attacker Training Environment
The state space includes information from 6 surrounding
vehicles and the AV. As defined in IV-A, the information
includes each vehicle’s relative longitudinal position, relative
lateral position and relative speed. In addition, we also in-
clude the AV’s action in the attacker’s state space. Therefore,
in total we have a 24-dimension state space, i.e. S ⊆ R24.
All the states are scaled for neural network training.
At initialization, the attacker is located near the AV. As
shown in Fig. 2, the attacker (the red box) can be observed
by the AV (the blue box). Although the attacker can observe
AV’s relative position, velocity and its action, the attacker
do not have direct access to the AV’s policy. Therefore, we
are preforming a black-box attack.
B. Reward Considering Socially Acceptable Attack
The key component for training a socially acceptable
attacker’s policy is the reward. The attack agent is rewarded
if it causes a collision between the AV and one of the
Fig. 2: Attacker’s training environment. The blue box: the
AV; the red box: the attacker; green boxes: other surrounding
vehicles in attacker’s state space; empty boxes: unobserved
surrounding vehicles
environment cars (not necessarily the attacker), in which the
AV is at fault per RSS. In this work, we encode the RSS [13]
model and traffic rules through associated reward to train the
attacker. Here we recall the 5 “common sense” rules followed
by RSS [13]:
1) Do not hit someone from behind.
2) Do not cut-in recklessly.
3) Right-of-way is given, not taken.
4) Be careful of areas with limited visibility.
5) If you can avoid an accident without causing another
one, you must do it.
The first three “common sense” principles above are
related to traffic rules and implemented through associated
reward. The forth is not applicable in our highway scenario.
To implement the fifth, we refer to another MOBILEYE pa-
per [14]. The MOBILEYE group has implemented the RSS
model on NHTSA pre-crash scenarios in [14], where they
define “proper response” to dangerous situations as using
Minimal Evasive Effort (MEE). MEE deals with cases in
which extra caution is applied to prevent potential situations
in which responsibility might be shared. Here we extend the
MEE concept, and try to create situations where only one car
(the AV) is responsible for the crash. We still expect both cars
involved in the crash to use MEE. For instance, in the rear-
end collision (which is the rear car’s fault), we still expect
the rear car to brake before crash. In this work, we only
define the MEE for the responsible car for simplicity, but
the MEE for the irresponsible car can be defined similarly.
Also, in this paper, the action space is discrete. However,
this concept can be extended to continuous action space.
In this work, the reward function is r(s, a), where the s
is the state, a is the attacker’s action at state s. To separate
the responsibility, we did one step further simulation without
execute the actions, getting the next state s′ and the attacker’s
action a′. Since the simulator is deterministic, the reward
function can be further extended to r(s, a, s′, a′). If at state
s′, the victim crash, if s as the pre-crash state and use
responsible car’s next action (included in s′) as an indicator
for MEE. The pre-crash situation and reward is defined in
Table I. In this work, instead of implementing the whole
RSS model, we only consider one pre-crash state. Therefore,
no blame time concept as in [14] is implemented in this
application. In the future, if one wants to implement the
entire RSS model, we recommend modeling the attacker’s
policy with recurrent neural network and design the reward
function accordingly.
The MEE of the responsible car is also implemented in the
TABLE I: Reward design for socially acceptable attack
Pre-crash situation The Responsible Car Minimal Evasive Effort (MEE) Attacker’s reward FCResponsible car Irresponsible car Fault MEE Reward
No car is on the lane
marker
The rear car Hard brake -
Env. car No -1 0Yes -0.5 1
Victim No 1 2Yes 0.5 3
Only one car is on the lane marker and crash with the car in the original lane: Same as no car is on the lane marker
Only one car is on
the lane marker:
crash with the car in
the target lane
The lane-change car
Abandon the
lane change -
Env. car No -1 0Yes -0.5 1
Victim No 1 4Yes 0.5 5
Both cars are on the same lane marker: Same as no car is on the lane marker
Both cars are on the
lane marker:
different lane mark-
ers
Share responsibility,
but left car is the
principal responsible
car
Abandon the
lane change -
Env. car No -0.8 0Yes -0.3 1
Victim No 0.8 6Yes 0.3 7
reward. When collision happens, we expect the responsible
car to try to avoid the crash. As only one time step is being
considered and the action space is discrete, we define the
right choice of action as MEE for each pre-crash situation.
As can be seen from Table I, the pre-crash situation can be
categorized as no car is on the lane marker, one car is on
the lane marker and both cars are on the lane markers. More
detailed categorized pre-crash scenarios are shown in the first
column of Table I.
As shown in Fig. 3, when no car is on the lane marker,
the rear car (blue one) is the responsible car for the crash.
Therefore, the rear car is expected to conduct a hard brake
to avoid the crash. Fig. 4 shows the pre-crash situation in
which only one car is on the lane marker and crash with the
car in the target lane. In this case, the lane change car (blue
one) is the responsible car and is expected to abort the lane
change to avoid the crash. As shown in Fig 5, we illustrate
the pre-crash situation in which both cars are on different
lane markers. We assume that vehicles travel on the right,
then in this case, both cars are at fault, but the vehicle from
the left lane should yield to the vehicle from the right lane
according to the Chinese traffic law [19]. Therefore the left
car (blue car) is mainly responsible for the collision and is
expected to abandon the lane change to avoid the crash.
According to the responsibility and the defined MEE for
each pre-crash situation, we further assigned the reward.
Positive reward is given to the attacker if it lures the victim
to end up with a crash which is the victim’s responsibility.
If the attacker can find a way to further lure the victim to
directly crash into another car without MEE, the attacker will
be rewarded even more. On the contrary, if the attacker is
responsible for the collision, negative reward is given to the
attacker.
The attacker also has a time cost of −0.05, which encour-
ages the attacker to cause a collision as soon as possible. An
episode is terminated if either of the following happens:
• The AV crashes with another car;
Fig. 3: Pre-crash instance with no car on the lane marker
Fig. 4: Pre-crash instance with only one car on the lane
marker and crash with the car in the target lane
• The attacker crashes with one car and the reward for
the attacker is −1;
• The AV leaves the neighborhood of the attacker, i.e. not
being one of the 6 surrounding cars of the attacker and
the reward is −1.
We also record the Failure Code (FC) for each episode, as
shown in Table I. The definition of each code is described
as follows:
• 0: The other car is responsible for the crash (w/o. MEE);
• 1: The other car is responsible for the crash (w. MEE);
• 2: The AV crashes into the front vehicle w/o. hard brake;
• 3: The AV crashes into the front vehicle w. hard brake;
• 4: The AV changes lane and causes collision w/o. trying
to abandon the lane change;
• 5: The AV changes lane and causes collision while
trying to abandon the lane change;
• 6: The AV changes lane from the left to the middle lane
and crashes with the car changing lane from the right to
the middle lane, w/o. trying to abandon the lane change;
• 7: The victim changes lane from the left to the middle
lane and crashes with the car changing lane from the
right to the middle lane, while trying to abandon the
lane change.
Fig. 5: Pre-crash instance with both cars are on the different
lane markers
As shown in Table I, the AV-responsible crashes, in which
the AV did not use MEE, are valued most by the attacker (i.e.
FC: 2, 4 and 6). This kind of crash is the most harmful crash.
Moreover, the action chosen by the AV’s policy before these
crashes definitely deserve a closer look and possible revision.
In summary, instead of finding a crazy attacker, we trained a
“socially acceptable” attacker which explores the weakness
of the AV and helps to improve its policy.
VI. SIMULATION SETUP
In this Section, the simulation setup for training the
attacker is described. The reinforcement learning algorithm
we use is DDQN. The hyper-parameters used during training
is shown in Table II. To accelerate the training, we defined
two replay buffers, one is for storing normal cases and the
other is for storing crash cases in which the AV agent is
responsible. Therefore, the reward for socially acceptable
attack and the failure code can be seen as a way to prioritise
all the collected samples. Use of two replay buffers is a
simpler version of prioritized experience replay as discussed
in [20], which has been implemented similarly in [18].
TABLE II: Hyper-parameters for the attacker training
Description Value
γ Discount factor 0.9
∆t Sampling time 1 sec
ρ Learning rate 1e−6
0 Starting value for -greedy exploration 0.2
C Annealing factor for -greedy exploration 2e−6
T Steps for each episode 200
E Total training episode 1e5
During the evaluation phase, the AV is evaluated in the
original environment (without the attacker) and then the same
environment with one attacker. The AV is evaluated in both
environments, with the total number of cars being 10, 15 and
20. The AV is evaluated for 1e6 episodes and each episode
lasts for 200 steps unless terminated early due to a crash.
VII. RESULTS
In this Section, both the training curve of the attacker and
the evaluation results of the AV in different environments
are reported. As described in [18], after training, the AV’s
policy become safe and stable in the original environment.
As shown in Fig 6, the attacker is trained for 1e5 episode
and evaluated by 10 roll-outs every 100 episodes. We train
the attacker 10 times and average the evaluation roll-outs
rewards. As can be seen from the Fig. 6, the attacker’s policy
is stable after 1e5 training episodes.
Fig. 6: Average reward from 10 evaluation roll-outs with
confidence bound
As described in Section VI, the victim agent is then
evaluated in two environments: the original environment
and the environment with one trained attacker. In both
environment, the victim is evaluated for 1e6 episodes. The
results are shown in Table III. The definition of failure code
is described in Section V-B and here we only focus on the
AV’s responsible crashes (failure code 1 to 7). In the bottom
of Table III, we report both the number of crashes between
the attacker and the victim, and the total number of crashes.
TABLE III: Number of crashes during evaluation
# of env. cars
Failure Code
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
w/o.
attacker
10 0 0 5 0 46 0 0
15 0 0 14 0 55 0 0
20 0 0 12 0 33 0 0
w. one
attacker
10 656/657
239/
239
180/
186
43/
78
101/
156
504/
504
9/
9
15 447/448
172/
172
163/
164
26/
45
63/
88
283/
283
3/
3
20
419/
598
168/
168
137/
139
20/
32
59/
64
237/
273
1/
1
As can be seen from the table, there are many more crashes
when one attacker is introduced. For crashes with failure
code 2, 4 and 6, where the victim is mainly responsible,
the number of crashes jump from 0 to hundreds. This is a
proof that our proposed method can modify the environment
transition model to increase risky but socially acceptable
behaviors from other vehicles, which can provide hints on
how the AV policy can be further improved.
One reason why our method works, is that the original
reward function for training the AV does not consider the
crash responsibility. As can be seen from Fig 7, the victim
(blue car) is facing a situation where it will either crash into
the front vehicle or crashed by the rear vehicle. Since the two
situations are valued the same by the victim, in this episode,
the victim actually crashes into the front vehicle.
Fig. 7: The victim (blue car) instead of braking and crashed
by the following environment car or changing lane, it actually
abandons the lane change and crashes into the front car
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows that the AV policy learned by deep
reinforcement learning can be fragile, i.e., can still result
in accidents and collisions even when the vehicles around
it behave in a socially acceptable fashion. We design an
attack agent by perturbing the environment transition model
to induce collisions that AV would be at fault. In this work,
one attacker agent is added to the environment, and the safety
of the AV drops significantly. The identified collision cases
can also be used to train a new AV policy.
There is a lot of potential to extend the work presented
in this paper. In this paper, we apply this socially accept-
able attack in an environment with discrete action space.
However, it can be extended to environment with continuous
action space by modeling the MEE with continuous action.
Although we add only one attacker to the environment, it
can be extended to multi-attacker scenarios. Finally, one can
also extend our approach by designing a Markov Game and
train both the victim and the attacker together.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We would like to thank the authors in paper [18] for
making the our AV policy implementation possible.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton, “Imagenet classification
with deep convolutional neural networks,” in Advances in neural
information processing systems, pp. 1097–1105, 2012.
[2] A. Hannun, C. Case, J. Casper, B. Catanzaro, G. Diamos, E. Elsen,
R. Prenger, S. Satheesh, S. Sengupta, A. Coates, et al., “Deep
speech: Scaling up end-to-end speech recognition,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.5567, 2014.
[3] I. Sutskever, O. Vinyals, and Q. V. Le, “Sequence to sequence learning
with neural networks,” in Advances in neural information processing
systems, pp. 3104–3112, 2014.
[4] T. B. Brown, D. Mane´, A. Roy, M. Abadi, and J. Gilmer, “Adversarial
patch,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.09665, 2017.
[5] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, I. Goodfellow, S. Jha, Z. B. Celik, and
A. Swami, “Practical black-box attacks against machine learning,” in
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia conference on computer and
communications security, pp. 506–519, ACM, 2017.
[6] E. R. Balda, A. Behboodi, and R. Mathar, “Adversarial examples in
deep neural networks: An overview,” in Deep Learning: Algorithms
and Applications, pp. 31–65, Springer, 2020.
[7] C. Xiao, X. Pan, W. He, J. Peng, M. Sun, J. Yi, B. Li, and
D. Song, “Characterizing attacks on deep reinforcement learning,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.09470, 2019.
[8] S. Huang, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, Y. Duan, and P. Abbeel,
“Adversarial attacks on neural network policies,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1702.02284, 2017.
[9] Y.-C. Lin, Z.-W. Hong, Y.-H. Liao, M.-L. Shih, M.-Y. Liu, and M. Sun,
“Tactics of adversarial attack on deep reinforcement learning agents,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.06748, 2017.
[10] Tencent Keen Security Lab, “Experimental security research of tesla
autopilot,” 2019.
[11] A. Gleave, M. Dennis, N. Kant, C. Wild, S. Levine, and S. Russell,
“Adversarial policies: Attacking deep reinforcement learning,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1905.10615, 2019.
[12] M. L. Littman, “Markov games as a framework for multi-agent rein-
forcement learning,” in Machine learning proceedings 1994, pp. 157–
163, Elsevier, 1994.
[13] S. Shalev-Shwartz, S. Shammah, and A. Shashua, “On a for-
mal model of safe and scalable self-driving cars,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1708.06374, 2017.
[14] A. Shashua, S. Shalev-Shwartz, and S. Shammah, “Implementing the
rss model on nhtsa pre-crash scenarios,” tech. rep., 2018.
[15] J. N. Tsitsiklis and B. Van Roy, “Analysis of temporal-diffference
learning with function approximation,” in Advances in neural infor-
mation processing systems, pp. 1075–1081, 1997.
[16] V. Mnih, K. Kavukcuoglu, D. Silver, A. Graves, I. Antonoglou,
D. Wierstra, and M. Riedmiller, “Playing atari with deep reinforcement
learning,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.5602, 2013.
[17] H. Van Hasselt, A. Guez, and D. Silver, “Deep reinforcement learning
with double q-learning,” in Thirtieth AAAI conference on artificial
intelligence, 2016.
[18] S. Nageshrao, E. Tseng, and D. Filev, “Autonomous highway driving
using deep reinforcement learning,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.00035,
2019.
[19] Government of China, “中华人民共和国道路交通安全法，第
三十五条[Law of the People’s Republic of China on Road Traf-
fic Safety, No. 35].” http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/
23/content_25575.htm/, 2004. [Online; accessed Mar-2020].
[20] T. Schaul, J. Quan, I. Antonoglou, and D. Silver, “Prioritized experi-
ence replay,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.05952, 2015.
